Abstract. The quantitative information flow bounding problem asks, given a program P and threshold q, whether the information leaked by P is bounded by q. When the amount of information is measured using mutual information, the problem is known to be PSPACE-hard and decidable in EXPTIME. We show that the problem is in fact decidable in PSPACE, thus establishing the exact complexity of the quantitative information flow bounding problem. Thus, the complexity of bounding quantitative information flow in programs has the same complexity as safety verification of programs. We also show that the same bounds apply when comparing information leaked by two programs.
Introduction
A non-interferent program [13, 20] ensures that low-security observations by an adversary of an execution of the program is independent of its high-security inputs, thus preserving confidentiality of its inputs. While non-interference is desirable, explicit outputs of a program often violate non-interference. For example, the winning bid in an anonymous auction reveals information about all other bids, namely an upper bound on other bids. Therefore, others (e.g [12, 14, 19, 22] ) propose to quantify the amount of information leaked by a program in order to evaluate security of programs. In these quantitative approaches, a program is seen as a transformation of a random variable taking values from the set of inputs into a random variable taking values from the set of observations. The amount of information leaked by the program is modeled as the difference between the initial uncertainty and the uncertainty remaining in the secret inputs given the observations an adversary makes about the execution of the program. In order to measure uncertainty, information-theoretic measures such as Shannon's entropy [12, 14, 19] and min-entropy [22] are employed. The appropriate measure of information usually depends on the application. Min-entropy, for example, is used to measure vulnerability to being guessed in one try and is useful for measuring information leaked by password-checkers. However, note that this is inappropriate for voting protocols which publish vote tallies as an unanimous election always reveals how each voter voted and min-entropy based measure will say that all information is leaked for such protocols. Thus, min-entropy will not be able to distinguish a secure electronic protocol from an insecure protocol protocol such as one which outputs a list of voters along with their voting preferences. Using Shannon entropy to measure information leaked is more appropriate for such protocols.
We consider the complexity of evaluating the amount of information leaked by a program when the uncertainty is measured using Shannon's entropy [21] as has been proposed in [12, 14, 19] . In this case, the amount of information leaked by a program is mutual information between the inputs and outputs. We start by considering the complexity of quantitative information flow bounding problem [25, 27] : given a program P with uniformly distributed inputs, and a rational number q, check if the information leaked by the program does not exceed q. 3 The quantitative information flow bounding problem was first considered in [25, 27] who study complexity of the quantitative information flow problem for (deterministic) imperative Boolean programs. They show that the problem is PP-hard for loop-free Boolean programs. The class PP is the class of decision problems solvable by a probabilistic Turing machine in polynomial time, with an error probability of less than 1 2 . This implies, in particular, that the quantitative information flow bounding problem is harder than reachability in loop-free Boolean programs as the latter is NP-complete and the complexity class PP contains the complexity class NP. Intuitively, the hardness of problem comes from the fact that one has to compute, for each possible output, how many inputs lead to that particular output. For reachability, we only have to guess one input which leads to the reachable state.
For Boolean programs (with loops), the quantitative information flow problem was shown to PSPACE-hard in [25, 27] . However, no upper bounds are given in [25, 27] . The problem was shown to be in EXPTIME in [5] . They also show that the problem is PSPACE-complete when the number of outputs is logarithmic in the size of the program.
We briefly recall the strategy used in [5] to establish that the quantitative information flow bounding problem is in PSPACE when the number of outputs is logarithmic in the size of the program. The proof therein relies on a recent result on straight-line programs (SLPs). An SLP is a sequence of assignments to integer variables in which the operations allowed are addition, subtraction and multiplication (no division). The value of the variable last assigned to is said to be the number defined by SLP. A recent result shows that the problem of checking whether an SLP defines a strictly positive number is decidable in counting hierarchy [2] , which is contained in PSPACE. Now, [5] show that for each program P and rational number q there is an SLP prog (P,q) such that the information leaked by the program by program P does not exceed q iff the number defined by prog (P,q) is strictly positive. The program prog (P,q) is polynomial in a size of P and q if the number of outputs of P is logarithmic in the size of the program (and can be constructed in polynomial time). However, if there is no restriction on number of outputs then the size of prog (P,q) can be exponential in the size of P. Therefore, they have to restrict the number of outputs to achieve the PSPACE upper bound.
Contributions. Our first contribution is to show that the quantitative information flow bounding problem is in PSPACE which matches the PSPACE lower bound without any restrictions on the number of outputs, thus establishing the exact complexity of quantitative information flow. This is surprising since checking safety of Boolean programs (or reachability in Boolean programs) is also PSPACE-complete. This shows that the problem of bounding quantitative information flow is (complexity-theoretically) as easy as safety verification of Boolean programs.
For the upper bound, we cannot directly use the construction of the SLP prog (P,q) outlined in [5] as the size of prog (P,q) is exponential in the size of P. Instead, we establish a new result about PSPACE-SLP generators. A PSPACE-SLP generator F is an algorithm that outputs an SLP on its input w, using only a polynomially-bounded work-tape (note the output can still be exponential in |w|, the length of w). We give sufficient conditions that ensure that the problem of checking whether, given w, the number defined by the SLP F (w) is strictly positive can be decided in PSPACE (even when the output F (w) is exponential in length of w). We then show that there is a PSPACE-SLP generator f that a) satisfies the above conditions and b) given a program P and a rational number q computes the SLP prog (P,q) .
We then consider the quantitative information flow comparison problem: given programs P 1 and P 2 check if information leaked by program P 1 is less than the information leaked by P 2 . The quantitative information flow comparison problem was first studied in [26] , where they show that the comparison problem is #P-hard for loop-free Boolean programs. 4 We show that the quantitative information flow comparison problem is also PSPACE-complete by using methods similar to the quantitative information flow bounding problem.
Finally, we are able to conclude PSPACE-completeness for quantitative information flow bounding problem and the quantitative information flow comparison problem when the observations of the adversary are not explicit outputs, but implicitly derived from the timing behavior of an execution of a program. Following [5] , we abstract the timing behavior as the number of steps of the execution of a program. The conclusion follows from the observation that a Boolean program takes at most an exponential number of steps 5 and hence can be encoded by a binary counter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce relevant notation and definitions in Section 2. We establish our result on SLP-generators in Section 4. The results on quantitative information flow bounding problem and quantitative information flow comparison problem are presented in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
Related work. In the recent years, several automated approaches from modelchecking [3, 18, 7, 8] , static analysis [9] [10] [11] 3] and statistical analysis [18, 6] have been employed to compute the information leaked by a program. The complexity of computing the amount of leakage was only considered recently [26, 25, 27, 24, 5] . The problem was first tackled in [26] , where quantitative information flow comparison problem is studied. The PSPACE lower bound for non-interference was shown in [27] which implies the lower bound for both the quantitative information flow bounding problem and for the quantitative information flow comparison problem. A PSPACE upper and lower bound for programs for measures based on min-entropy and guessing entropy was established in [27] . However, an exact upper bound was not known for the case when the information is measured using Shannon's entropy.
Non-interference and quantitative information flow bounding problem when programs are modeled abstractly as nondeterministic transition systems are considered in [23] and [24] respectively. In this setting, the problems are shown to be PSPACE-complete. 6 However, this only implies an EXPSPACE-upper bound because the translation into an explicit state description causes an exponential blowup. For example, the following program with three variables x, y, z:
is represented in [24] as a state machine with 16 states. (The factor of 2 is due to the program counter).
As discussed above, the best known upper bound for quantitative information flow bounding problem was EXPTIME [5] which follows from EXPTIMEcompleteness of quantitative information flow problem in recursive Boolean programs [5] . The EXPTIME upper bound improves to PSPACE when the number of outputs variables are logarithmic in the size of the program [5] .
The proof of the PSPACE-upper bound in [5] is established by reducing the quantitative information flow bounding problem in PSPACE to checking whether an SLP defines a positive integer. The restriction on the number of outputs ensures that the constructed program is polynomial in length. Then the recent result of [2] is invoked which shows that the problem of checking whether an SLP defines a positive integer is in counting hierarchy and hence in PSPACE. Since we are not restricting the number of outputs, the reduction yields an SLP which is exponential in input size. Thus, we cannot use [2] and have to establish our result on SLP generators.
Attacks based on implicit observations of program execution, such as timing behavior, are hard to protect against and can lead to serious breaches of confidentiality (see for example, [4] which exhibits a practical timing attack against OpenSSL which allows the adversary to obtain private RSA keys.) Hence, several approaches have been proposed in the literature to counteract timing leaks (see [1, 17] for example).
Preliminaries
We recall some standard definitions and establish some notations. Note that for a set X, the set of all boolean valued functions with domain X shall be denoted as 2
X . Please note that our notations closely follow [5] .
Boolean Programs
Syntax: The programs that we consider have input variables, output variables and local variables. Input variables can be either high-security input variables, meaning that the adversary cannot observe their values, or low-security input variables, meaning that their values are known to the adversary. The output variables will be low-security variables, i.e., their values shall be observable to the adversary. The values of local variables will not be observable to the adversary. Formally, we assume a countable set Vars of variables which can take Boolean values (true) and ⊥ (false). The set Exps of Boolean expressions is generated by the following BNF grammar (x ∈ Vars):
A program can manipulate its variables using statements. The set of statements, Stmts, is defined by the following BN F grammar (x ∈ Vars, φ ∈ Exps):
As usual we say that Vars(s) is the set of variables occurring in s.
A program P is of the form
where s is a statement and
Semantics: Recall that a transition system, T , is a tuple (Q, →) where the set Q is a finite set of configurations and →⊆ Q × Q is a set of transitions. T is said to be deterministic if c → c We give an informal description of the semantics of programs. The operational semantics of a program P can be given in terms of a deterministic transition system (Conf P , → P , c 0 ) of size exponential in the size of P . A configuration c ∈ Conf P keeps track of the "current line number" and the "values" of the variables of the program P. A transition in → P represents one execution step of P. The program P terminates on inputs
there is a computation from a configuration in which the "current line number" is the line of the first statement of P, the input variables are set to − → h 0 , − → l 0 , and the local and output variables are set to ⊥ that reaches the configuration with the "current line number" corresponding to line number of the last statement of the program. If P terminates, we define the output of P to be the values of the output variables upon termination.
Therefore, P can be seen as a partial function
, and is the value output by P on
From now on, we will confuse P with the function F P . We will only consider terminating programs. One could possibly model non-termination as an explicit observation and our complexity results will not change in that case. This is because nontermination on an input can be decided for while programs in PSPACE.
Mutual Information
We recall some standard definitions. Let X be a discrete random variable with values taken from a finite set X. If µ is the probability distribution of X , the Shannon entropy of µ, written H µ (X ), is defined as
If X and Y are discrete random variables taking values from finite sets X and Y with joint probability distribution µ, the conditional entropy of X given Y, written H µ (X | Y), is defined as
The mutual information of X and Y, written I µ (X ; Y), is defined as
We have I µ (X ; Y) ≥ 0.
quantitative information flow in programs
We use conditional mutual information to quantify the amount of information leaked by the program as has been proposed in [12, 14, 19] . We assume that the reader is familiar with information theory and in particular conditional mutual information. As discussed above, the semantics of a Boolean program P is a function P : H × L → O. Assume now that the inputs are sampled from a distribution µ. Let H be the random variable taking values in H and L be the random variable taking values in L according to the distribution µ. µ can be extended to a joint probability distribution on H, L and O as follows
The information leaked by the program P is then defined to be
In case there are no low-security inputs, the information leaked by the function F is just the mutual information between H and O:
A program P is non-interferent iff SE µ (P ) = 0 for all µ.
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We now recall a result proved in [5] that will allow us to restrict our attention to programs that have only high-security inputs. Given a program P with high-security input variables − → h , low-security input variables − → l and lowsecurity output variables − → o , let the program P nolowinp be defined as follows.
For each variable l ∈ − → l , pick a new variable l new . P nolowinp has high-security input variables − → h , − → l and no low-security input variables. The output variables of P nolowinp are − → o and − − → l new . The program P nolowinp initially copies the values − → l into − − → l new and then behaves exactly like P. The following is shown in [5] :
Note that when µ is U, the uniform distribution on H ×L, we have that H µ (L) = log |L|. Thus, it follows that if P has r low-security input variables, we get that Proposition 2. SE U (P nolowinp ) = SE U (P ) + r.
Thus, for uniformly distributed inputs, we shall only need to consider programs with no low-security inputs. We shall make use of the following theorem proved in [3, 16] : Theorem 1. Let F P : H → O be the semantics of a program P with no lowsecurity inputs. Then
Decision problems for quantitative information flow
The quantitative information flow bounding problem: The quantitative information flow bounding problem asks, given a program P and a rational number q ≥ 0, whether the information leaked by P does not exceed q, i.e., whether SE U (P ) ≤ q. The input to the decision problem is the program P and q (with numerator and denominator given in binary). The size of input problem is the size of P and the size of numerator and denominator q.
The quantitative information flow comparison problem:
The quantitative information flow comparison problem asks, given programs P and P , whether the information leaked by P exceeds the information leaked by P , i.e., whether SE U (P ) < SE U (P ). The input to the decision problem are the programs P and P .
Straight-line programs (SLP)s.
Let V ar be a countable set of variables. A (division-free) straight-line program (SLP) is a finite sequence of statements of the form x ← 0 or x ← 1 or x ← Y Z, where ∈ {+, −, ·}, x ∈ V ar and Y, Z ∈ V ar ∪ {0, 1}. are taken from a countable set of variables.
An SLP p is said to be closed if each variable that appears on the right-hand side of a statement also appears on the left-hand side of a preceding statement. The semantics for any such program is the usual where ← corresponds to assignment and the operators +,−,· are addition, subtraction and multiplication over the set of integers, Z. The value of a closed SLP p denoted by val(p) is the value of the last variable assigned in its last statement. The problem PosSLP is to decide, given a closed SLP p, whether val(p) > 0. It is shown in [2] that PosSLP is in counting hierarchy.
The standard square-and-multiply algorithm for exponentiation gives us the following. 
SLP generators
Given a finite set of variables V , we will say that a SLP generator compatible with V is an algorithm that outputs a closed SLP which uses variables in V. We shall be interested in special kinds of SLP generators: Definition 1. An SLP generator f compatible with V is said to be a good SLPgenerator if:
-f is a function computable in PSPACE, i.e., for any input w, f (w) is computed using polynomially bounded workspace. -For any input w, if the SLP f (w) were to be executed then for each x ∈ V at any point, the value of the variable x is ≥ −2 2 |w| and is < 2 2 |w| , where |w| is the length of w.
Please note that the output f (w) generated using a good SLP-generator f can be exponentially long (in terms of |w|), as will be the case when we apply our results in Theorem 2. We will be interested in deciding whether for a given w, the value of the program f (w) > 0. Since, f (w) is exponentially long, we cannot directly apply result of [2] which says that PosSLP is in counting hierarchy and hence in PSPACE. However, the conditions of being a good SLP generator will allow us to adapt the proof of PosSLP being in counting hierarchy to establish the following result, whose proof has been moved to the Appendix for the sake of the flow of the paper.
Lemma 1. Given a good SLP generator f compatible with V , the following language is PSPACE:
Complexity of quantitative information flow
We will now consider the quantitative information flow bounding problem and the quantitative information flow comparison problem, showing both of them to be PSPACE-complete. Since non-interference in Boolean programs is PSPACEhard [27] , these two problems are easily seen to be PSPACE-hard. We only need to show the upper bounds. We start by first considering the quantitative information flow bounding problem. We shall need one Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let P be a program with − → h as high-security input variables, no lowsecurity input variables and − → o as the output variables. If n is the number of high-security input variables and O = 2
Proof. Since mutual information is always positive, we have that SE U (P ) ≥ 0. Thus, by Theorem 1, we get that
The claim follows by exponentiating both sides.
Theorem 2. The quantitative information flow bounding problem is PSPACEcomplete for Boolean programs.
Proof. We only need to prove the upper bound. Thanks to Proposition 2, we only need to consider programs with no low-security inputs. Let P be a program with high input variables − → h and low-security output variables − → o . Let the number of input variables be n and the number of output variables be m. Let H = 2
Let q be a rational number. We have |H| = 2 n . Theorem 1 implies that SE U (P ), the information leaked by P , is
Thus,
Observe that the number 2 n (n − q) is polynomial in the size of the program P and rational number q and can be computed in polynomial time. Thus it suffices to show that for any given positive rational number r s , we can decide if
in polynomial space (r can be taken to be positive as a program never leaks more than n bits). Note that since
it suffices to show that we can decide if
In order to show this, we will construct a good SLP generator f that given a program P and natural numbers r and s, constructs a SLP program with 6 variables 9 S such that
The result will then follow from Lemma 1. Let k be the size of s. We make a few observations before we show how to construct f. We will use j to range over the m-bit binary natural numbers representing elements of O. Similarly, each input of P can be identified with a n-bit natural number. (e) For any output j, |P −1 (j)| can be computed using a work-tape polynomial in the size of P as follows. We initialize |P −1 (j)| as 0. Recall that every input can be represented as a n-bit integer. We utilize this to iterate over all inputs as follows. We initialize a n-bit integer k as 0. At the 1-st iteration, we take all inputs to be zero, run the program P on this (which can be done in polynomial space) and check whether the output of P is j or not. If the output is j then we increment |P −1 (j)| otherwise we leave |P −1 (j)| unchanged. In either case, we increment k. At k + 1-st iteration, we take the input corresponding to k, run the program P on this input and check whether the output of P is j or not. Once again, if the output is j we increment |P −1 (j)| otherwise we leave |P −1 (j)|. In either case, we increment k. The iterations stop when k becomes 2 n . Now, we describe how the good SLP generator f is constructed. f will use six variables {z, x 0 , y 0 , x 1 , y 1 , res} and its input tape will have a definition of P along with natural numbers r and s written on it. We give the psuedo-code for f in Figure 1 and describe f in detail. The PSLP f uses two integers j and k. j is used to iterate over outputs. In each iteration, the integer count is used to compute the number of inputs that lead to the output j. The computation of count is done by iterating over all inputs (k is used for this iteration).
At the first step f will output the assignment z ← 1. Now, f will do 2 m iterations numbered 0, 1, . . . , 2 m−1 . At iteration j, f first computes |P −1 (j)|. Note that as observed above in (e), |P −1 (j)| can be computed using polynomial workspace by iterating over all possible inputs, running program P for each input. After computing |P −1 (j)|, f computes |P −1 (j)|s and f outputs the SLP computing |P −1 (j)| |P −1 (j)|·s using variables x 0 and y 0 . Without loss of generality,
Input: P, r, s where P is a program, r and s are natural numbers. Let h0, h1, · · · , hn be the input variables of P and o0, o1, · · · , om be the output variables of P. { int k,j,count,power; Output("z ← 1"); for (j := 0, j < 2 m , j + +)
Output(expSLP (count, power, x0, y0)); Output("z ← z · y0"); } Output(expSLP (2, r, x1, y1)); Output("y1 ← y1 − 1"); Output("res ← z − y1"); } we can assume that the variable assigned to in the last statement of the program for |P −1 (j)| |P −1 (j)|s is y 0 . After outputting the SLP defining
f outputs the assignment z ← z · y 0 . Using observations (a) and (b) above, it is easy to see all these 2 m iterations can be done using polynomially bounded space.
After the 2 m iterations are over, it is easy to see the SLP output thus far has value o∈O |P −1 (o)| |P −1 (o)|·s and that the variable last assigned to is z. f next outputs the SLP for 2 r using variables x 1 and y 1 with y 1 being the variable assigned to in the last statement of the SLP for 2 r . f then outputs the assignment y 1 ← y 1 − 1.
Next, f outputs the statement res = z − y 1 and then terminates. It is easy to see using observation (c) above that f is a good SLP generator. and that if S is the SLP output by f then val(S)
The result follows from Lemma 1.
Similarly we can show that the quantitative information flow comparison problem is PSPACE-complete. Proof. First, we make an observation that we will allow us to assume that the programs being compared have the same number of input variables. If P is a program with n inputs, let P moreinputs be the program with n + k inputs which is constructed from P as follows. P moreinputs has exactly the same set of lowsecurity input variables and the same set of output variables as P . P moreinputs also has each high-security input variable that has P has. In addition P has k new high security inputs o . Then using Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, it follows that SE U (P ) = SE U (P moreinputs ).
As observed above, we only need to show the upper bound. Now, let P and P be two programs with the same number of input variables m and with O and O as the set of outputs respectively. If r 1 and r 2 are the number of low-security input variables of P 1 and P 2 respectively then it is easy to see using Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 that
Note that 2 m is representable by a m-bit integer. The result follows by observing that we can check if
in PSPACE in a fashion similar to the proof of Theorem 2.
Information leaked from timing behavior
We now turn our attention to the problem of estimating the information leaked by a program by its timing behavior. [5] propose using the number of steps taken by a program as an abstraction of timing behavior. Thus, in order to measure the information leaked by a program by its timing behavior, we can consider P as function from its inputs to natural numbers and define the amount of information leaked by the timing behavior as in Section 3. . Now, we can define SE µ (Steps P ) in a manner analogous to the definition of SE µ (P ). Definition 2. SE U (Steps P ) is the information leaked by the timing behavior of P .
A terminating while program takes at most c2 t steps, where c is the number of statements in the program and t is the total number of variables of the program. The number of steps can be represented as a natural number whose (binary) size is polynomial in the size of program. It is easy to see that the proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 can be modified to show the following (the lower bounds follow from [5] ):
Corollary 2. The problem of bounding information leaked by the timing behavior of a Boolean program is PSPACE-complete. The problem of comparing information leaked by timing behavior of Boolean programs is PSPACE-complete.
Conclusions and Future work
We have shown that the quantitative information flow bounding problem and the quantitative information flow comparison problem for Boolean programs are PSPACE-complete. Surprisingly, this matches the PSPACE-completeness of safety verification of Boolean programs. The same bounds apply when the adversary observes the number of executions steps and not explicit outputs.
The PSPACE-upper bound result implies that the quantitative information flow bounding problem is reducible to safety verification of Boolean programs. While we have not given this direct reduction, one can be obtained by composing the reductions in the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2. Thus, in order to check if the information leaked by a program is less than q we can reduce the problem to the safety verification problem of Boolean programs and then use an off-theshelf verification tool. We are currently investigating this approach.
In order to establish the upper bound, we establish a new result on SLP generators. In particular, we give sufficient restrictions that ensures that the problem of checking whether the number defined by the output of an SLP generator F on input w is strictly positive can be decided in PSPACE. This result may be of independent interest.
